Hack Mac OS X With Installer Packages 194
nezmar writes, "MacGeekery has a short but insightful piece with examples on how to use a malformed Installer package (.pkg) on Mac OS X to 'insert user accounts with administrator rights and change root-owned system configuration or binary files without prompting the vast majority of Mac OS X users for a password of any kind.'" The article notes that this issue was brought up on the Apple Discussion Boards 6 weeks back and that it was noted there as a duplicate / known issue. It also gives as an example the installation of Parallels, the popular virtualization software, which uses the described technique, but not for nefarious purposes.
Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
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However its important to make sure they trust the source they recieve the software from.
As in the rest of life, use common sense and apply good judgement, stay away from the shady parts of the internet and you won't get stung. A reputable company would not risk the lawsuits with distributing known hacked packages.
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it still asked me for a password (Score:3, Insightful)
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Re:it still asked me for a password (Score:5, Interesting)
Basically the guy suggested that the authentication dialog should have a user customisable image (you would customise in control panel). That way when the password entry dialog appears the person would know whether the password request dialog was being provieded by the system, or being faked. The idea is that the is little chance in the rogue program working out the image the user used to authenticate password dialogs.
It also makes us realise that validity of Microsoft providng the facility of signing packages. Although there are chances that you can have a faked certificate, this would help you limit yourself to a party with a valid certificate, if you so choose. The important point is that the certificate is used as an indication, not as a control mechanism.
The truth is though, if you have enough careless users installing random garbage you increase the chances of your system getting 0wned, no matter what the OS. It is the same principal as in the real world where even if you have the best security system, if you have people leaving doors open, covering detectors because they make life inconvenient they are truely worthless.
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This would probably work really well until somebody figured out how to access the custom
Re:it still asked me for a password (Score:4, Informative)
The new authorization dialog boxes in Vista are like this; this is the reason they take over the desktop. IIRC, you can hit CTRL+ALT+DELETE while one of these is up and you'll know its authentic because it'll stay there (if it weren't you'd switch to the "Windows Security" screen instead.)
Of course, these are useless if the OS is already compromised, but the whole idea is to keep it from getting that far.
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Lets hope its not broken.... (Score:2)
Unlike Windows where its not secure as you can intercept it.
Have a look at SysInternals - Ctrl2Cap [sysinternals.com] utility for a working example.
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You can't intercept it without modifying the OS kernel. And if you've done that you already own the machine. ctrl-alt-delete is a very low level signal. This has been around since NT for login, it's nothing new. On linux you can customise what the combo does by modifying the inittab file.
Here is the FIX (Score:4, Informative)
If you always run as a sudo user then you are exposed to this hole. It's not techincally a hole, but most people would consider it an unexpected behaviour. Most people figure that if they don't give the installer their password then it can't be installing anything priveldged. Wrong, it is possible. But you were installing so....you sort of got what you asked for, but obviously it's ripe for a trojan.
The fix I give above simply forces the expected behaviour. If something wants to modify privledged files then it has to ask.
Now here's the nice thing. Unlike linux and windows, it is a perfectly pleasant experience for a poweruser to run as anormal user on a mac. I'd die if I had to have this dual account system on linux, since not having super user privs is a pain. KDE and GNOME try to help you with some operation, but it's so inconsisten you cant make it work well.
But on mac's it's nearly seemless. Anytime you need to authorize it pops up a window asking for a sudo account name. It's ubiquitous and there's virtually no time you need to be logged in as sudo-user. For extensive scrirpted or CLI coperations the terminal suffices to su to the sudo user. Now about once or twice a year, I find some situation where it is simpler to be in a GUI desktop as the sudo user. (one of those is fink-commander) For that there's fast user switching which lets me flip over to a logged in sudo GUI account instantly.
It's painless.
WHY this is unexpected for macs (Score:5, Informative)
On a mac, it's normally possible to install an application without requiring any super user privledges. On linux and Windows it's frequently impossible or at least quite hard (on linux you often have to fiddle with the make configuration, and it results normally in a crippled application.
Here's one example. On a windows computer when you install something it has to have some way to get it's hooks into the OS. This might be as simple as notifying the OS of what extension/suffixes it can open or what services or filters it provides to other applications. This is done through the registry. And you need to be root to modify the registry. So you can't really install anything properly without giving your application the ability to write to the registry.
And since there's no selective privledges that would say "well I trust you to only modify this part of the registry and no where else nor any other file, you basically pull your pants down around your ankles, close your eyes and pray there is no unsolicited finger up the butt every time you install. Linux is simmilar, since it propably wants to shove stuff in
On a mac, applications don't do that. Normally an entire application lives in a single folder with no stuff placed anywhere else. SO how does the application provide services? Well what happens is that the operating system will interorogate the Application when it is installed or when you boot or launch it the first time. Inside the application is a standard XML file info.plist that declares all sorts of things the OS might want to know about the application. And then the OS relays this to the other applications as serices that are available. This is how for example, the OS knows what applications can open what kind of documents.
As a result, there is no need to unbuckle your jeans and grab your ankles when you do an install in most cases. And it's also easy to undo an application since the number of places it touches (usually just the application's folder and the library/preferences)
Now I just said in most cases. Some applications do need privledges since they are going to make strong modifications. THis might be installing a start-up item, for example, or things that make intimate hardare interface modifications And for those when you run the installer script you naturally expect it to ask you for your password so it can escalate it's privs.
And there is the problem. It turns out that the installer application on a mac, is a an application that can retain root privs after the first time you grant them (like says SETUID). To me this would seem unneccessary, but it does. And it turns out that if you are a sudo users, and if you have ever granted the installer elevated privs, then when it goes to install an application the requires elevated priv, it does not have to ask you for them! Now it also turns out that in most cases the applicaitons that are being installed can't know if a sudo user or a normal user is installing them so they automatically ask for the password. But they don't have to if you are sudo.
So the fix is not to install as a sudo user. Then the installer can't get the elevated privs be default. And so the application is forced to ask for them if it needs them.
Thus when your "make-a-smiley" application you got from gatorware asks for root during the install you have a chance to rethink if this might be a trojan.
Thus the behaviour of the installer that blows past the authentication check is bothersome to mac users even though they are doing an install. On linux and windows doing an install normally is always done at root privs so the peril is always there.
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Don't get me started on the lack of an uninstaller (I've seen uninstall instructions for an app that
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yum remove [appname]
Debian/Ubuntu:
apt-get remove [appname]
AutoPackage (distro independent package system):
package remove [appname]
All do a clean uninstall.
forgot (Score:2)
make
make install
In
export PATH=$PATH:$HOME/apps
export CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -L$HOME/apps/lib -I$HOME/apps/include"
I haven't had that fail me. If you need to install something from source that needs to be accessible for other users, install it in
* Package repositories exist for a reason. Use them.
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Re:WHY this is unexpected for macs (Score:5, Informative)
According to the Apple documentation linked from TFA, if this behaviour is actually happening, then it is neither expected, nr proper, and is definitely a bug. How the article writer managed to arrive at the conclusion that Apple's documentation say it is correct and expected, I don't know.
On a mac, it's normally possible to install an application without requiring any super user privledges. On linux and Windows it's frequently impossible or at least quite hard (on linux you often have to fiddle with the make configuration, and it results normally in a crippled application.
On Windows this is an issue completely up to the application developer, who decides a) whether their installation procedures requires access to system areas, and/or b) whether they allow the user to specify where to install the applications (and/or c) if they bother to check the privilege level that the user has).
On Linux, if you're compiling from source, it's a matter of passing --prefix=/some/path to 'configure'. WIth packages, it's a function of the package manager and subject to the same restrictions regarding whether or not the developer has done the right thing.
OS X is *exactly* the same.
Here's one example. On a windows computer when you install something it has to have some way to get it's hooks into the OS.
No, it doesn't.
This might be as simple as notifying the OS of what extension/suffixes it can open or what services or filters it provides to other applications. This is done through the registry. And you need to be root to modify the registry. So you can't really install anything properly without giving your application the ability to write to the registry.
This is wrong.
Firstly, you don't need to be "root" to write to the Registry (Windows has no "root" equivalent and access to the Registry is governed by the same types of ACLs that restrict filesystem access, applied on a per-Registry-key basis).
Secondly, file associations and similar config data are stored in the per-user Registry hives which, of course, users are (typically) able to modify. The equivalents in OS X are all those XML config files hiding in your home directory (which, of course, you have permissions to modify - although access is not restricted at the same fine-grained level as it is to the Registry).
And since there's no selective privledges that would say "well I trust you to only modify this part of the registry and no where else nor any other file, you basically pull your pants down around your ankles, close your eyes and pray there is no unsolicited finger up the butt every time you install. Linux is simmilar, since it propably wants to shove stuff in /bin and maybe overwrite somethings in /lib.
There most certainly *is* the capability for such "selective pivileges" when accessing the Registry, and it is enforced. Linux (and unix in general - including OS X), however, lacks both the centralised repository to lock down access to such a degree and the fine-grained permissions system to actually do so, and is somewhat hampered by the fact "root" has no restrictions whatsoever (at least in typical configurations).
As a result, there is no need to unbuckle your jeans and grab your ankles when you do an install in most cases. And it's also easy to undo an application since the number of places it touches (usually just the application's folder and the library/preferences)
From a technical perspective, the situation in Windows (and Linux, to a less degree) is no different.
And there is the problem. It turns out that the installer application on a mac, is a an application that can retain root privs after the first time you grant them (like says SETUID). To me this would seem unneccess
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According to the Apple documentation linked from TFA, if this behaviour is actually happening, then it is neither expected, nr proper, and is definitely a bug. How the article writer managed to arrive at the conclusion that Apple's documentation say it is correct and expected, I don't know.
**perhaps if you are no
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Whilst I understand that in some circumstances it would not be workable to run as a non root user whi
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But trying to run in a gui as unprivledged in linux is a freakin nightmare. For example when you try this and you run a GUI program that need root (like say Gparted) then if you are truly Gnome or KDE will pop up a dialog asking for the root password. But that's asking for the root password, not asking for any user who has sudo. So if you are not root or have the root password then it
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If you are running a single user system or are administrating a home PC for a small number of users then its likely that you will know the root password. The whole point is that not everyone should be able to carryout these tasks (not everyone with an account should be on the sudo'ers list). If you just want partition info then there are a hosts of KDE and Gnome applications that will giv
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I saw the smiley, so I get your jist. But more seriously, that's sort of the point. If you are the super user but you run normally as root, it's a hassle on Linux to do some sys admin tasks without logging in as the super user's desktop. So naturally one tends to run as a sudo or super user as ones normal desktop.
If you are running a single user system or are administrating a home
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I think he is complaining because the graphical sudo programs in GNOME and KDE only work if your logged in user is in /etc/sudoers, they don't give you the opportunity to run as a user *not* in /etc/sudoers and specify a dedicated "sudoer" username/password when something needs to be run as root.
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I've known about this hole for about a year (yes I reported it to apple). The solution, which I use myself, is very simple. Do not run as sudo. I have two accouint. my everyday account and my sudo-user account. If you always run the installer as normal users then it will be forced to ask for a sudo-account name and password any time it needs to escalate privledges. There that's the fix.
That's a problem as well as a solution. Not many people setup two or more accounts, one for su and one or more account
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linspire (Score:2)
unless things have changed linspire makes all users root unless otherwise told. yikes! watch out.
Before I saw the computers it was installed on, which I got one, I don't recall having heard of before. I got idea that it's by Lindows. What really got to me, and unfortunately many if not all computer manufacturers are now doing, it doesn't come with any printed manuals. And I like to RTFM. So I went to the Linspire website to print out what they have, and it didn't seem to me to be organized that well.
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By 'the sudo user' I assume you mean 'a sudoer' (i.e., by default, an administrator). Why do you need to be an administrator for Fink Commander? It prompts you for a sudoer's name and password just like any other application. For self-repair, you might need to enter the password twice; but I run it just fine as an ordinary user.
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Ouch (Score:5, Informative)
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According to the documentation linked from TFA, this behaviour is neither "proper", nor expected. Assuming the documentation is correct, it's not a design flaw, it's just a bug.
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Of course they should. I thought the "serious design flaw" made that clear.
I liked the guys attitude, it is not like "Installer is evil" things probably by some Unix geeks that hates everything easy and automatic.
Well, I suppose I'm a Unix geek and I like things that are easy and automatic. That's why I don't like installer packages and do like self-contained app bundles.
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*sound of crickets in the night*
Hear that? That's the answer from the Mozilla guys about implementing MSIs, which they said they would do for 1.5. It's still not going into 2.0, and we'll be lucky if they do it in 3.0. You might be thinking of NSIS, which they redid the installer with - this is an open-source installer tool (written by Nullsoft as the original Winamp installer).
I may not be a big fan of Windows, but I'll certainly say that havi
Hacking OS X? Hardly (Score:5, Insightful)
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This is worse because any Joe on the Internet can create one of these packages. (Yes, any joe on the internet can create a debian package, but that's not a typical use case for apt users, whereas it's the only use case for Apple users.)
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Sure, people may (will?) soon find out I'm a bad guy, but the exact same situation is the case here.
I don't see the usage difference you're talking about either - if I'm installing something I want/need, I'm going to do it on Debian
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Debian packages are signed by the Debian project when they are approved for inclusion. If you have nasty bits in your package, you're not going to get it signed.
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Maybe this is the difference - *I* think Apple and the debian project are equally trustworthy when it comes to installing applications into thier respective OS's. Perhaps you don't.
Simon
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The difference, such as it is, is that few debian/kubuntu/gentoo/etc users install any packages except from the "official" repositories. Anyway, I think that was the point my granparent was trying to make.
However, the real reason why MacOs'ians are a lost case, securitywise, is that most of the source code is unavail
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In OSX, there are two types of installer package things, admin ones and root ones. Running as an admin user (that is, a user that can become root-ish (like through sudo), if you install a root-level installer, you are prompted for your root password, yadda yadda. If you run an admin-level installer, no password is asked, and the vulnerability is here. Inside of that admin-level installer, root-level things can be done.
So no. Your password is never asked, an
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Darwinports -- which does need, or want, to
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My understanding of the issue is that an admin user is simply someone on the sudoers list, and not actually root. This would akin to a .deb file that, when installed by a user on the sudoers list and not root, doesn't prompt for any password at all, but has root access none the less. This would seem to be an issue if I am, in fact, interpreting all of th
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That's what I just said. It asks me for my password and only then I get promoted to the admin user (by means of sudo I assume). The point of the article is that "without prompting the vast majority of Mac OS X users for a password of any kind". If someone then says "most OSX users run as admin by default" that makes it sound as if users are running a root account by default. Which is not simply true.
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So whats the big deal?
Re:Hacking OS X? Hardly (Score:5, Insightful)
Exactly! But when do you get root priviledges? Only after you give your password to sudo (either on the cli or in the installer). Before that point you have as much privileges as a ordinary user.
The little thread started because cgenman said "OSX users run as admin by default" with which he seemed to imply that Mac OS X users run with root priviledges by default and therefor don't get prompted for a password. But this is not the case.
I don't even think we're making a different point. My definition of admin is just more confusing I guess. You're indeed right that the default user is a user from the admin group, but my point is that even though the user might be an admin, he doesn't have root priviledges without giving a password first.
Re:Hacking OS X? Hardly (Score:5, Informative)
The problem is with the package management. What the article is saying is that package creator is allowed to set authorization for installation. They can choose either to authorize with Root privilege or with Admin priviledge. Installations that require Root privilege will prompt for password from a user even if the user is logged on as an Administrator. Admin privileged installation doesn't require a password if the user is Administrator. The danger is that some installations which should require Root priviledge (ones that deeply modify the OS) can be carried out with a passwordless Admin priviledge, so the Admin doesn't realize just how much modification is being made to the system.
A scenario would work like this:
Admin thinks he just installing a regular editor application. Package author specifies installation with Admin priviledge no authorization. Admin proceeds to install package but is unaware that package install program is silently adding system kernel extensions. Normally, this would require Root priviledges for system modifications, but doesn't because of this weakness in the installation api.
Let me get this straight ... (Score:3, Insightful)
So, when you're logged in as admin, and you install a package, that package can add whatever is in that package. Isn't that how it is supposed to work?
I'm not seeing the problem here. Am I missing something?
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I'm not seeing the problem here. Am I missing something?
I'm with you on this. Having Administrator power is supposed to let you do dangerous things.
From the article:Well, duh!!! Only Windows users are that stupid, right?
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Maybe because you add nothing to the discussion. You simply agree and then toss in a cheap (flame) insult. And then in your whining about accurately being modded, you simply toss another flame (Are most OS/X users as security-stupid as Windows users?) on the fire.
If your goal is to add nothing and just toss bitchy insults out there, don't be suprised of you are modded as such.
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Go back to Junior High and take a refresher course in Grammar. (Is it a flame when the other person deserves it?)
Question:
Flame:
Big difference, since (since I don't know any Mac users) I do not know any Mac users, so I really don't know whether they are as dumb as Windows users.
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Oh, sure! I'm certain you were expecting a bunch of well thought out replys discussing if Mac users and/or Windows users are stupid and really get to the bottom of this deep question. Its a textbook flame, deal with it. You were just tossing out insults in some sad attempt to make yourself feel superior.
Here's the thing, many of us
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I used windows (all versions) and OS X, I know the difference. I tried to run windows like normal user, at end I found myself copying my "regular user" directory to Administrator direct
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What's the difference between root and Admin? Or, better yet, what is the *purpose* of Admin? On Linux (and I'm positive it works the same on {Free|Open|Net}BSD, you log in as as unprivileged user and then open up an xterm where you either "su -" or sudo.
There are thousands of Mac users who run regular user
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On a practical level, the purpose of Admin (aside from being a sudoer) is that they can manage the applications and settings on the system without being nagged. An Admin user can change things in the global
Admi
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My problem with that is it's like giving root multiple passwords, all of which work. Once you know one you can rape the system.
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Are you saying that the insane quantity of malware, virii, and other attacks on Windows is the fault of the users? Most don't even know that something was just install on their system or that it is running, and that includes experienced users.
This same type of issue is what is being discussed.
At least in this case, the issue requires a user to run an installer, but they should still be prompted for root-level access. In a case like this, i
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I disagree with your inference. In the Windows world, there the Administrator user is essentially the full root user, whereas in Mac OS X, the Admin user can be granted root permissions, but it is supposed to require a password in ord
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It is not the same as root nor as Admin accounts on Windows.
On Mac OS X, the Admin account is like an in-between between regular user and root. That is, when you are logged on as an Admin, it generally allows you to do things that normal users can do, plus any permissions given specifically to Admins (these are not common). On the other hand, you _can_ also do anything else that you want, as root would, BUT befor
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1. The default user Apple makes is an admin. Non-computer-literate folks don't know this.
2. Without providing a password, this gives an installer script root access.
3. People will double-click anything.
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3. People will double-click anything.
As an addendum to this I'd like to add that most users will double click on anything, and when nothing happens, they will continue to double click until something either does happen or their mouse finger falls off, or their computer dies. Whichever happens first.
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The big deal here is that the additional password prompt---which signals the fact that you are changing system files---allegedly never happened under the conditions described here.
How about new kind of user? (Score:2)
The extras depends on the system and how far you'd want to go to protect the system.
root could lose some access (ie: read-only OS.)
the install user would be limited to mostly disk related activities. This is just 1 example of the features that could be possible by singling out the whole process of system level software installation.
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So, in summation (Score:5, Insightful)
2. Regular folk should only install software from reasonably trusted sources.
I would assume that second point would be clear, given 10 years of watching Windows users open every last attachment that arrives in their inbox, while we sit at our Macs and laugh, but something tells me, probably not.
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Therein lies the rub. How many packages under MacOS or Windows can you install fromsources that you trust?
I asked a Windows firewall developer who was developing a firewall based on BSD sources. Yet when I wanted to try the product, the developer was all "*clueless*" about why I would would need the sources to run their "special", "free", firewall product [coresecurity.com]. The fact that they didn't, even, understand the need to compile from so
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Not a "solution" per se, but (Score:5, Informative)
I've tried to explain to other Mac users that running as an admin by default is bad, and they always come back with "but you always get a pop-up asking for your username and password anyway, so you always know something is up". Unix-heads know this is wrong, but Mac users as a whole are as uninformed as your average Windows user.
The silly thing is OS X makes it absurdly easy to run as a non-admin. Just create a second account, make it an administrator, and then remove that privilege from your own account! If some task needs admin privileges, OS X will automatically prompt you for an admin account login - you don't even need to think about it beforehand (unlike XP's less-than-perfect "Run as..." solution). If an application tries to do something admin-y without asking you to authenticate as an admin, it will fail.
The only time this is ever a hassle is if you're installing one of a handful of software packages that doesn't use the OS X security framework. Adobe is the most egregious offender in this regard - they even require that the first time you launch a number of their programs (right after install in other words), it has to be done as an administrator. There's no good reason for them to do this, but it's part of their "We can't stop the pirates, but we can darn well make it a pain for law-abiding customers" initiative.
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Read the discussion board thread linked from the story (I know, this is Slashdot, but...). The issue is that the user didn't have to type in ANYTHING, period. It wasn't that some extra nefarious stuff happened during an installation; he was able to install the php5 package without being prompted for a log in at all. Just being an admin was enough.
The wide
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- Google Earth (mentioned by someone else) will run fine, but you'll have to install it using the admin account.
- App Zapper requires an admin account to even use the app. I wrote to them about it, and got back a somewhat generic "yeah we've thought about it, but you should be deleting from an admin account" reply. I'm guessing this is an old-school Mac developer that has a bit to learn about Unix.
- Most
Thank You! (Score:2, Funny)
Read my previous guide to securing Mac OS X and do not run as an admin user for daily activities.
Moreover, if you must run as the administrator, do not install packages from non-reputable sources without cracking open the package
Well, thank you, Captain Obvious!
"Installs" are bad (Score:4, Interesting)
One of the great features of the original MacOS was that it didn't have "installation". You put an application somewhere, the Finder found it, and you could launch it. If you wanted to delete it, you deleted it, and it disappeared. Maybe once in a while you had to rebuild the desktop to update the derived info that made this work.
But now, Apple has "installation", where install programs put stuff all over the place, and maybe change the state of the system. Just like Windows. Big step backwards.
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One of the great features of the original MacOS was that it didn't have "installation". You put an application somewhere, the Finder found it, and you could launch it. If you wanted to delete it, you deleted it, and it disappeared.
Have you ever installed one of the following (and these are the first three that spring to mind)?
Quark Xpress
Microsoft Office
MacLink
Extensions, libraries, fonts, helper programms all over the place
And don't tell me you forgot the torture that was Extension Manager [foundationstone.com.au] already.
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Frameworks, like Quicktime or SDL, work in a similar way, though they get dropped in the "Library/Frameworks" folder.
The only things that use the Installer are things that need to
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If developers used packages more things would be better though I must say.
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It was an inescapable side effect of moving to an OS that actually had the concepts of "security" and "permissions".
Not a real concern (Score:3, Informative)
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Once you're penetrated... (Score:4, Insightful)
Once an attacker has gained the ability to run unrestricted code on your computer, they can cause you grief even if they have no ability to install applications, install kernel components, run as root or Administrator, or even access the network. Being able to prevent applications from gaining extra privileges is good, at least it makes the cleanup easier, and possibly limits exposure to one account (though anyone who had an account on a shared timesharing system in college knows that's not guaranteed). But for most people, that account has everything they care about on the computer anyway, so once they're penetrated they're ****ed.
Apple needs to make the following changes to reduce the probability of penetration here.
1. Don't treat files (like, say, installers) as "safe". Treat applications that operate on files as "safe" or "unsafe", with "safe" limited to applications that are designed to deal with untrusted files.
2. INSTALLERS AREN'T DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH UNTRUSTED FILES. Don't run an installer automatically.
3. The user is allowed to shoot himself in the foot, but he has to actually pick up the gun and aim it aware that it might go off. It doesn't go in the bathroom cabinet with the hair dryer.
Don't mix untrusted and trusted files by default... downloads go in a "Downloads" folder, not on the desktop. Don't automatically install downloaded files, let the user request that. Don't run helper applications that are selected for the Finder or Windows Explorer, keep a separate list of helpers for web browsers and mail software...
PS: Mozilla folks: the same issue applies to XPI. You've got a big red tag on XPI installer saying 'THIS IS A GUN', but you're still leaving it in the bathroom cabinet next to the hair dryer. Cut that out.
Didn't you get the memo? (Score:2)
You can fucking say "fucked" on fucking Slashdot. Fuck.
Re: (Score:2)
Well, there's at least one project [nsa.gov] to do this kind of thing, which got taken up [fedoraproject.org] by a popular distribution. The fancy security certified OSes have been doing MAC for a long time. Now it's more a case of getting them distrub
Three lines of AppleScript (Score:5, Informative)
Euhm... so? (Score:2)
Seems nobody really got it. (Score:4, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
This behaviour must be a bug (Score:2)
Yet on the table here [apple.com], linked to from TFA, the documentation quite clearly states that if a user is already a
Whew! (Score:4, Funny)
root (Score:2)
But yes, as someone else posted:: Windos-like installers are the problem. Most OSX software is still installed by dropping it into Programs and you're done, and I very much like it that way (among other things, it makes it trivial to uninstall software, which is often a nightmare on windos because a good portion of the uninstallers don't clean up properly).
Trusted Software (Score:2)
If any of the above are true of the package you're inst
Why not have more than admin and user security? (Score:2)
Why did they use the "all or nothing" approach of requiring the admin password to install some things? Why not introduce a new model where everything in the filesystem is an object of one of the following types:
- operating system
- hardware
- hardware configuration
- program
- program configuration
- interface configuration
- data
Have the option of using different passwords for access to operating system, hardware, and program objects. When you run a program installer
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
If you can boot into single user mode, the machine is toast anyway. The best thing to do is to install Open Firmware Password [apple.com] to keep people from booting into single user mode or booting from another drive without the admin password, and then physically lock the machine so someone can't open it.